Analysis
Under the same heaven, China enters the diplomatic scene
In the conception of Beijing's current leadership, the world order should be tianxia, an equal and peaceful, harmonious order, able to resolve every difficulty thanks to the worldly wisdom being exchanged in the earthly realm, all mediated by a peaceful China.
“China is a story, but tianxia is a theory” – this is the first sentence of the book All under Heaven: The Tianxia System for a Possible World Order, by Zhao Tingyang, a Chinese political philosopher.
This beginning introduces two highly topical elements: China as “narrative,” as “storytelling,” thus something changeable, living and progressive; and tianxia as theory, i.e., the reworking of a current concept based on an interconnected and peaceful world (“all under heaven”), in which China has a central place but is not above (as the U.S. is in relation to the U.S.-led neoliberal global order in this framework).
Zhao Tingyang is conveying an ancient theory that has recently become official rhetoric in China. To simplify: in the conception of Beijing's current leadership, the world order should be tianxia, an equal and peaceful, harmonious order, able to resolve every difficulty thanks to the worldly wisdom being exchanged in the earthly realm, all mediated by a peaceful China.
This is, of course, a China-centric view, but it also gives us a theory that can be studied further and identified in practice, namely in China's current international posture. Let us start with an example: the Chinese position on the war in Ukraine has been a source of much concern for Beijing: the decision not to abandon Russia and instead support it politically and economically, while declaring that it did not support its war effort, has greatly worsened China's image on the international stage.
In the course of these two years, the new international order confronted the CCP with the need to explain and develop an international strategy able to redefine the cornerstones of its foreign policy and adapt to the new scenario. A number of documents emerged: first the position paper about the war in Ukraine (which has been mistakenly read as a peace plan in the West), then a policy document on global security and one on global civilization.
One particular point emerged from all of this: Beijing reaffirmed its historical posture toward the global South, only taken into account in the West because the war in Ukraine brought out a world that we did not see (and now that we do, it’s not as if Western positions in this regard have significantly changed). But China has always had this posture as part of its various international stances as they changed over time: in Mao's time, in the midst of the Cold War, during the Deng era, when China tended to be more restrained in international relations, or in the pre-Xi era with Hu Jintao. Hu, underestimated even by many China researchers, worked out four pillars that we can say are still in effect today.
The four pillars are: managing China’s relationship with the great powers, managing China’s own region (Asia), remembering its foundation and origin, that is, the global South, and using multilateralism as a tool. Obviously, we are in another realm with Xi Jinping: nowadays Chinese foreign policy aims to create an international order that revolves around business and trade, not the political form of the international actors. And what it offers is a picture of China at the center of tianxia.
Given these premises, a rather clear tactical approach by China to the Ukrainian issue has emerged over time: political support for Russia to sustain an anti-Western stance – a rhetoric that finds purchase precisely in the global South, composed of countries that have a memory of colonization and other Western interference; an attempt to avoid sanctions and still maintain relations with the West, albeit minimal, while seeking to exploit its problematic points (Hungary, Serbia, etc.); and a reluctance to hastily put themselves forward as mediators, aware that no mediation between Russia and Ukraine has reached a point that would suggest a possible mediated solution to the war (and also considering the likely American obstructionism if China takes on a more prominent protagonist role).
Now, however, it is undeniable that the situation is fluid once again: the world's leading power is looking forward to six months of foreign policy run by an outgoing president suffering from serious cognitive difficulties; and although the Democrats are in a competitive contest with Trump, the U.S. is perceived as “weak” at the moment, while Europe is also feeling the “fatigue” (to use Meloni’s term) of a war that has become entrenched and doesn’t seem to be able to be resolved militarily.
This is the context for China extending an invitation to the Ukrainian Foreign Minister to travel to Beijing. And the three-hour meeting between Kuleba and Wang Yi actually yielded an important result for once: that Kyiv is willing to involve Russia in the negotiations (only if they act “in good faith,” Kuleba stressed, but that's still something). As the meeting was taking place, Zelensky also had some interesting remarks: after recently railing against Beijing, in recent days he has said he trusts Xi and his reassurances that China is not selling arms to Russia.
Beside the meeting on Ukraine, there was also the “Beijing declaration” of 14 Palestinian factions: a very fragile agreement that probably won’t last long, but one that demonstrated China's willingness to offer itself as a global mediator. In this, it makes two claims: that it is a great power on par with the U.S., and that, by contrast, it plays the role of a “facilitator.” As in: they’ll get the parties in conflict at the negotiating table, but from that point it’s the latter’s responsibility to move things forward. The subtext seems to be that China (unlike others) doesn’t want to force anybody to do anything. One certainly cannot take that as a disinterested foreign policy, but what country doesn’t have an interest behind its actions?
Whether one likes it and agrees with it or not, Beijing’s offer is that it can be a mediator in a world that is no longer unipolar – at least in the view of the majority of countries in the world.
Originally published at https://ilmanifesto.it/sotto-lo-stesso-cielo-lentrata-in-scena-della-diplomazia-cinese on 2024-07-26