Analysis
New Magyar, same Hungary? The knowns and unknowns of the new PM
While proposing a vision for Hungary that is different in a number of ways from Viktor Orbán's illiberal one, the Tisza president did not forget to recall that his roots are in the conservative right.
In his first public appearance as the winner of the Hungarian elections, Péter Magyar launched a frontal assault on the power dynamics that have ruled Hungary during 16 years of Orbánism.
Promising the creation of an Anti-Corruption Office and a constitutional amendment to impose a two-term limit for the prime minister, the Tisza party leader had some very harsh words for the President of the Republic, Tamás Sulyok: “Anyone who allowed their country to be robbed, anyone who said nothing when thousands of children were defiled by pedophile monsters, is not a president in my eyes. And I hope he understands that. I will say it again: he should step down,” he stated during his press conference on Monday.
The message, which seems to presage an unprecedented institutional crisis, is in fact premised on an unspoken awareness of the danger that the major national institutions – still in the hands of Fidesz – could pose to Tisza. It is no coincidence that, shortly thereafter, the future Hungarian prime minister promised to remove the heads of the police and the tax agency, both politically appointed by the previous government.
While proposing a vision for Hungary that is different in a number of ways from Viktor Orbán's illiberal one, the Tisza president did not forget to recall that his roots are in the conservative right. This was a given: for 20 years, Magyar was a member of Fidesz and part of Orbán's inner circle. His “road to Damascus” moment came in 2024, during the protests that led to the resignation of Katalin Novák, the then-President, accused of having granted a pardon to a person convicted of covering up cases of pedophilia. Amid this scandal, Magyar rose to the leadership of Tisza, managing within two years to completely upend Hungarian politics.
Magyar's political origins became even more apparent when he spoke about the issue of migration: “There are European countries that have managed to resolve the problem of complying with EU law while simultaneously preventing the entry of illegal migrants. Slovakia and Poland are an example of this: it is possible, you just need the will to do it,” he stated, reiterating his commitment to strengthening the infamous wall on the border with Serbia.
Not only that: the presence of border guards will be significantly increased, precisely to discourage illegal migration, in a disturbing continuation of Orbán's policies. This is a decision in line with Tisza's support for the new return regulation approved by the European Parliament: Magyar had no qualms voting in favor alongside Fidesz and the neo-fascist Our Homeland (Mi Hazánk) party.
In foreign policy too, despite promising a renewed commitment to Europe and to NATO, Magyar might disappoint the high expectations of many. During his meeting with journalists, the future prime minister spoke about relations between Hungary, Russia and Ukraine. Regarding Moscow, despite an election campaign run under the 1956 slogan “Ruszkik, haza!” (Russians, go home!), the Tisza leader seems to have partially softened his tone. While framing future relations in a more pragmatic – that is, more independent – terms, Magyar noted that “we cannot change geography. Russia will still be here, Hungary will still be here. We will do everything possible to diversify, but this does not mean we will separate. We will always procure oil in the most economical and secure way.” Thus, there will be a diversification of energy sources away from Russia, but not too much.
Future relations with Kyiv could also be anything but straightforward. While expressing solidarity in the face of Russian aggression and suggesting he would no longer block the €90 billion European loan to Ukraine, Magyar reiterated his agreement with Orbán's decision that Hungary should stay out of the loan, just as he reaffirmed his opposition to fast-tracking Ukraine's entry into the EU.
Relations with Israel are even more uncertain: “The relationship between the two countries is special because of Hungary's large Jewish community,” Magyar noted, but the new government may not continue to block European criticism of Benjamin Netanyahu's policies, effectively opening up scenarios that were previously unthinkable in Budapest.
And while Magyar seemed to have softened some of his previous conservative positions on LGBT rights, stating that in his Hungary “anyone will be able to gather freely and love whomever they want,” the issue of the homophobic provisions inserted into the Constitution by Orbán was not directly addressed. Furthermore, the future prime minister praised Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni: “Italians think she is doing a good job, and I would like to meet her.” At the very least, he did offer a guarantee that he “will not call Putin or Trump.”
The celebrations sparked by Orbán's historic defeat thus seem overshadowed by the possibility that the change might be more superficial in nature. And while Magyar has officially promised to free Hungary from the “Orbán mafia,” his decision to nominate István Kapitány, a former vice president of Shell, and Anita Orbán, a longtime manager in the US LNG sector with ties to Trump's Heritage Foundation, for key positions highlights the risk that the country will end up under a new oligarchy. The danger is that of a proverbial “Fidesz with a human face,” with new faces but the same underlying system.
At this point, it must be noted that a progressive front is entirely absent.
Originally published at https://ilmanifesto.it/la-nuova-ungheria-di-magyar-tra-qualche-luce-e-molte-ombre on 2026-04-14