Massimo D’Alema: The Ocalan issue ‘could only be addressed between comrades’

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On November 12, 1998, Abdullah Ocalan, founder of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), landed at Fiumicino airport on a plane coming from Moscow. He had recently left Syria, driven out after years of being hosted there. Italian police arrested him, the first act in one of the episodes that have had the most impact on the Kurdish question and its relationship with Italy: during the two months Ocalan spent in Rome, an unprecedented mobilization and a collective awareness of the Kurds’ liberation struggle grew around the Kurdish leader.

In his office in Rome, Massimo D'Alema, who was the Italian Prime Minister during that time, still keeps a plaque on one of the shelves: a red star with the initials PYD above it – the Democratic Union Party, the political force of the Syrian Kurdish left, founded in 2003 and for 13 years one of the animating forces behind the democratic confederalism taking shape in the region. The first D'Alema government came into office a few weeks before Ocalan's arrival. It would remain in office for another ten months after the Kurdish leader's capture in Nairobi on February 15, 1999, exactly one month after he left Italy.

Did the government know that Ocalan was coming to Italy?

No. The Communist Refoundation did play a role in it, particularly Ramon Mantovani, but not in agreement with the government. I was informed the night Ocalan arrived in Italy. He had a pending arrest warrant from Germany. We were, and still are, bound before Germany by the Schengen Treaty: if a person with a European arrest warrant comes to Italy, we have to arrest them.

And it did happen: Ocalan was arrested at Fiumicino.

On that morning I spoke with Chancellor Schroeder: Germany did not want to send in an extradition request for internal security reasons, as there was a concern that a trial of Ocalan in Germany could have created tensions between the Turkish and Kurdish communities. We could have forced the issue, put him on a plane and sent him to Berlin, but we are sensible people. Ocalan was released and became a guest of the Italian government, taken for security reasons to a villa protected by law enforcement, where he received guests and had meetings. He was a free man, but under protection. Then all hell broke loose: there was an immediate extradition request from Turkey. We rejected it on the basis of the constitutional principle that we do not hand people over to countries where they face the death penalty.

What kind of pressure did the government come under?

It set off a very difficult diplomatic crisis involving Italian companies with investments in Turkey. There were demonstrations against Italy in Ankara, even attempts to storm our embassy. U.S. President Clinton called me and said that we were protecting a terrorist and that Turkey was a member country of NATO, so we had to hand him over. The Americans also took this position publicly, it was not just private pressure.

Some key players at the time also mention pressure from Confindustria.

I won’t say “pressure,” but delegations of businessmen from Confindustria came to me because of the threatened Italian interests in Turkey. And in the meantime, there was an initiative to grant Ocalan political asylum. We asked the asylum commission, which gave us a negative opinion: we couldn’t grant asylum to a person with an arrest warrant for murder within the European Union.

He did, however, receive asylum, months later.

The court held that asylum could be given. But in the meantime, he was gone.

But the government joined the lawsuit as a civil party, arguing against the request for asylum protection.

The legal professionals defended the opinion the commission had given us: it would be difficult to grant asylum to a person viewed as an international terrorist.

The court's decision would have solved the problem. It wouldn’t have been a political decision anymore. Couldn't you have waited?

There would have been serious problems no matter what. Even with asylum granted, we would have had to protect him, he would have been a target. We had a dialogue with Ocalan, through people, mutual friends, Kurds, Palestinians, who helped us convey to him that in his situation, we could guarantee him a safe exit from Italy. Asylum wouldn’t have changed his situation.

It would have allowed us to keep him in Italy.

But he was a free man, no one prevented him from staying here. He could go wherever he wanted. Let me be clear: We did not deport him, he was not handed over to anyone. There were intelligence services from across the world all around that villa: Turkish, American, Israeli. He was in a dangerous situation anyway, with or without political asylum. In the end, he became convinced that leaving was the reasonable decision.

Former lawyers for Ocalan told of a persuasion effort that included the Kurdish leader's own advisers. What role did the Italian government play?

It was right for him to leave; what was wrong is what happened after that. We made sure that he could leave Italy safely, which was not an easy matter at all from an organizational point of view.

Was a final destination already set?

There was an intermediate destination and there was a final destination. The Americans didn’t notice. Through certain subterfuges, we made everyone think that he was still here when in fact he was already gone. It was quite a complex operation and it was managed at the borderline level: such an operation could not be managed entirely by our apparatus without the Americans knowing. The police chief told me that I would have to find a way. We organized everything very well: he disappeared and arrived at a military base in another country. From there, he was supposed to go to South Africa.

In your view, why would South Africa have been safer than Italy?

In our country, he had been detected, he was surrounded. No one would have known he was in South Africa.

He could have stayed in Italy under asylum protection.

It would have been a state issue for his whole life. We would have needed to set up a fortress in Italy. Ocalan understood that; he was a person of common sense. In no Western country could he be safe. South Africa was a friendly, independent country, less influenced by the West. South African Vice President Mbeki was Nelson Mandela's heir, they were comrades, and this was an issue that could only be addressed between comrades. In contrast, Greece offered him much murkier protection: we protected him in the light of day, we took responsibility for it through diplomatic crises, economic damage, quarrels with the Americans. We took responsibility for saying we would not hand him over to Turkey.

Between Russia and South Africa, where does Greece come in?

I struck an agreement with Russian Prime Minister Primakov and South African Vice President Mbeki: Pretoria would receive him unofficially, but host and protect him. However, when Ocalan arrived in Moscow, he decided otherwise: he accepted a confidential invitation from the Greek government. Or rather, from Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos, who controlled foreign intelligence. Socialist Prime Minister Simitis told me that Pangalos had made contact with the Kurds and invited Ocalan without informing the government. So the Kurdish leader was hosted in some Greek embassies in Africa. In Nairobi they told him he had to leave because there was a European country that would give him political asylum.

But what happened?

It wasn’t true. Ocalan was sold out by a Greek intelligence officer. According to what the Greeks told me, he was captured on the way to the airport by the Israelis. It was the Israelis who captured him and handed him over to the Turks, so I was told.

You mentioned quarrels with the Americans. What kind of pressure did you come under?

It is clear that when an American ambassador comes to you and when you get a phone call from the president of the United States, the matter has a certain weight. You can politely tell him “no,” as we did: we are only a free country if we are willing to make use of our freedom. I think the Americans did it because it had geopolitical implications: at that time, there was a clash between Europe and the U.S. because the Europeans wanted to build the South Stream, the pipeline from Russia to southern Europe. The Americans were supporting an alternative project, a pipeline from Azerbaijan. The key country was Turkey, because both projects passed through the Black Sea. Creating a rift between Turkey and the European Union was in the Americans’ interest. Showing friendship with Turkey was also in the Americans’ interest. I think Clinton didn’t care about Ocalan, but only about the fact that tension between Turkey and Italy played into his strategy.

That was a key period for the Kurdish issue. From Italy, Ocalan laid the groundwork for the peace process.

The issue is about Turkey: the need to overcome a Turkish nationalism that has Ottoman origins. I don't think Ocalan's presence in Italy could have changed the course of Turkish politics. We did what could be done under the given conditions. We have a clear conscience: we didn’t hand Ocalan over to anyone and we have always supported the need for a political solution for the recognition of the rights of the Kurdish people in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran.

In those two months, did you ever meet with Ocalan?

No, never.

You didn't even talk to him on the phone?

I don't recall, but it was complicated. On the other hand, there are limits within which the mandate of the Prime Minister must be carried out. The Prime Minister is not a free man.

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Originally published at https://ilmanifesto.it/abdullah-ocalan-fu-catturato-dai-servizi-israeliani on 2025-02-14