Commentary
Madman theory and the role of rearmament
Instead of sowing uncertainty among adversaries about what his next move will be, Trump’s vacillating approach is fueling uncertainty among his allies.
The “madman theory,” attributed to Richard Nixon, posits that one should frighten the enemy by making it plausible to assume that one’s own strategic choices are not entirely rational.
“It is not good for us to give the impression that we are too rational or imperturbable. It helps if some elements seem out of control,” reads a well-known strategic document from the Vietnam War era.
Today, we are witnessing a new, paradoxical twist on this doctrine: instead of sowing uncertainty among adversaries about what his next move will be, Trump’s vacillating approach is fueling uncertainty among his own side: his European allies, as well as Ukraine, to whose defense the US is making a substantial contribution while at the same time seeking more and more to reap the benefits while offloading the costs.
“I never said they would win, I said they could win. Anything can happen. You know, war is a very strange thing,” Trump commented on Monday, speaking about the Ukrainians in one of his typical off-the-cuff remarks to the press. As a businessman who – as he likes to emphasize – has dedicated his life to the art of the deal, Trump knows that unpredictability is a negotiating asset, especially in an environment where norms and institutions have been demolished. At the same time, flaunting a power of judgment so unstable that it can appear arbitrary is undoubtedly consistent with the authoritarian design pursued by MAGA, both internationally and domestically, where neo-McCarthyism and the criminalization of dissent are looming over the upcoming midterm elections.
It will likely fall to historians to find a cogent explanation for Trump’s particular deference to the Kremlin. According to the Financial Times, during his recent, stormy meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky, this deference went so far that Trump reportedly referred to the Russian invasion as a “special operation,” and hinted that the Ukrainians must cede land or be destroyed. Zelensky left the White House without the Tomahawk missiles that would be able to strike deep into Russian military positions. Just weeks earlier, Special Envoy Keith Kellogg had said such deep strikes were legitimate. And Trump himself, at the end of August, had criticized Biden for not allowing the Ukrainians to return fire. This is a dynamic that appears bipolar in a psychiatric rather than a political sense: red-carpet treatment one day, threats the next.
Zelensky described the meeting with Trump as a success that led to Ukraine purchasing 25 Patriot air defense systems from the U.S. He added that he will take part in numerous meetings in Europe this week, including a European Council meeting scheduled for Thursday (while a preliminary meeting between Secretary Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in Budapest now seems very doubtful). There appears to be broad support among EU member states for a new €140 billion loan to Kyiv, potentially financed by overcoming their resistance to using frozen Russian assets. While the countries of the “coalition of the willing” are preparing to provide Franco-British-led “stabilization forces,” Italy’s Leonardo together with Thales and Airbus are exploring a new satellite joint venture that could be an alternative to Elon Musk.
In essence, after signaling his readiness to play the Tomahawk card, Trump seems to have put it back in his sleeve following a last-minute call from Putin and the perceived risk of escalation. Instead, he offered a defensive option (the Patriots) that will allow the Ukrainians to repel the increasingly frequent drone and missile attacks. The expected outcome is to wear down Russia’s firepower, likely while asking the Europeans to foot the bill. EU leaders readily aligned themselves with Trump, calling for a deal based on freezing the current front lines – a compromise Moscow is not inclined to accept.
On the ground, after 1,337 days of war, it’s the same pattern we have seen so far. A meta-analysis recently published by The Economist shows that Moscow’s summer offensive achieved meager results relative to the resources deployed: only 0.4% of Ukrainian territory was conquered, while failing to capture the key city of Pokrovsk (although its streets are starting to fill up with the bodies of civilians). Meanwhile, Russia’s war economy is reportedly stretched to its limit, with an estimated 100,000 Russian deaths in 2025 alone. Thanks to support from its allies and the U.S., Ukraine appears better positioned to manage a war of attrition, while doubts are growing about Russia’s ability to sustain the current pace of fighting.
Certainly, the two leaders who intend to meet in Budapest would both welcome the disintegration of the European Union through the rise of nationalist right-wing parties. However, if Russia is deemed incapable of winning in Ukraine, it becomes harder to argue that Europeans must arm themselves to the teeth – distorting their social compact and democratic foundations – in the name of a deterrence concept ultimately based on a rehashed version of the “madman theory.”
Originally published at https://ilmanifesto.it/la-teoria-del-pazzo-e-il-ruolo-del-riarmo on 2025-10-22