Reportage
Cuban resistance: small businesses in search of hard currency
Self-employment is the main expression of dissent. It is a daily way of distancing oneself from a poorly functioning state, without the need for political proclamations or organizations.
On a sunny Sunday in Havana, nearly 3,000 people crossed the Plaza de la Revolución and ran along the Malecón seafront. This colorful and cheerful crowd brought the 39th edition of Marabana, Havana’s international marathon, to life on Sunday, November 17. It was a beautiful demonstration of the resilience of Cuban sport.
Havana, like the rest of the island, had just been declared affected by an arbovirus epidemic (chikungunya, dengue, Zika) that has struck a third of the population. People now call it simply “the virus,” and that is the answer you often get when you ask about a friend or neighbor. “He’s got the virus” is what one hears again and again.
Such a widespread “virus” was the last thing Cuba needed. Especially after the disasters caused by Hurricane Melissa in the east of the island at the end of October. And especially in the midst of a multi-crisis – an economic, productive and social crisis that has been plaguing the island for years. For this year, ECLAC (the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) forecasts another recession year for the country (a drop of 1% in GDP, while the last five years showed an 11%), while inflation is eating away at wages and the economy is effectively adopting the dollar.
In other words, the gap is widening between those who have moneda dura (“hard currency” – dollars, euros, etc.) and those who live on the CUP, the Cuban peso. The former can access shops priced in foreign currency and set up small businesses; the latter are destined to fall into, or remain stuck in, a “condition of vulnerability” – that is, in increasingly widespread poverty.
In these circumstances, the one-party (Cuban Communist Party – PCC) government has not been able to react with the same resilience as the sports sector. Four years ago, it attempted a monetary reform, the Tarea Ordenamiento, but this led to a worsening of the situation: devaluation had no effect on inflation and therefore led to more people in poverty. Years of attempts to patch up the most dangerous consequences followed – with little success, but with renewed (and truthful) accusations that the Trump administration is strangling the economy.
In the coming days, the Political Bureau of the Cuban Communist Party will examine a package of measures to “eliminate the traps” (eliminar las trampas) and “relaunch the Cuban economy,” which will then be discussed in thousands of assemblies of workers and citizens across the island. One of these measures provides for a new floating exchange rate between the dollar and the Cuban peso.
In recent days, the Cuban government started a small “exchange rate war” against El Toque, a blog (based in the U.S.) that calculates a daily exchange rate between the CUP and major currencies, mainly the dollar and the euro. They are accusing El Toque of speculative operations organized with the support of U.S. authorities to “destabilize the currency” and thus the country.
El Toque actually uses an algorithm that collects and processes currency purchase and sale intentions in Cuba: therefore, not only is it inaccurate, but it can be (and has been) manipulated for financial speculation. Anyone can post online offering to buy, say, $1,000 at a price of 470 CUP per dollar. The exchange may not actually take place, but it is still recorded by El Toque’s algorithm. This obviously opens up possibilities for speculation.
The real problem, according to various economists, lies in the fact that the Cuban government is not (as of now) offering any alternative. When they function at all, state exchange houses (CADECA) have a limited quantity of dollars available, which they exchange at the official rate for individuals, which is around 120 CUP per dollar – meaning they operate at a loss because, in recent days, 1 dollar was worth more than 450 pesos on the parallel market.
The issue of controlling the value of the national currency is obviously essential: as economics textbooks teach, currency is nothing more than trust (in the state and the government). In Cuba, the issue is of even greater political importance. MSMEs (Mipymes) – mainly micro and small businesses – as well as the self-employed (trabajadores por cuenta propia or TPCs) need hard currency to function. The island is in a chronic and dramatic production crisis, and the government buys 80% of essential consumer goods (including food and gasoline) abroad. Control of hard currency is essential for both the government and small private businesses.
Self-employment is currently the main expression of dissent: it is a daily way of distancing oneself – not only economically – from a poorly functioning state, without the need for political proclamations or organizations. Earning a living outside state structures has become not only a way to live better but also a concrete way to resist. MSMEs – a myriad of kiosks or small neighborhood shops – have become a space of material autonomy from the state. Their daily practice challenges the logic of dependence on an omnipresent but inefficient and sometimes repressive state.
Faced with a state “infrastructure of control” that has been granting permits for new MSMEs sparingly for over a year, a “resistance infrastructure” is emerging – in other words, silent dissent. This is an expression coming from a part of the country that is asking (the government) for urgent changes, but – it must be strongly emphasized – while maintaining public safety. Not as the result of a revolt or, worse, an external intervention (which is opposed by almost all Cubans). The political opposition, the contra, largely organized from outside with the intention of overthrowing Cuban socialism, has very little traction on the island.
The Cuban Constitution (of 2019) establishes that “the state recognizes, respects and guarantees people freedom of thought, conscience and expression.” The government should take into account the forms of autonomy (economic, but potentially political) that are being created. It should seek to govern them as a “collective intellectual” of the nation.
If it chooses to silence these forms of dissent, it will not eliminate their causes, nor will it succeed in silencing those who are suffering. This is why the government’s upcoming reforms will be an important test for Cuban socialism. They are all the more important in a Latin American context where the Trump administration is determined to eliminate – including militarily, as in Venezuela – any form of political autonomy from the U.S.
Originally published at https://ilmanifesto.it/cosi-si-resiste-a-cuba-trincea-di-mini-imprese-per-avere-moneta-forte on 2025-12-04