Commentary
A confederal revolution to save
New points of balance and new arrangements appear necessary. Otherwise, the confederal revolution from Rojava could be crushed by a large-scale Turkish invasion.
In the course of the war, two different and opposing realities have developed in Syria: the theocratic insurgency, promoted by Islamist groups that crushed the democratic youth that was there in the first uprisings, and the confederal revolution coming from Rojava, which built political, economic and gender institutions of a radically transformative nature.
However, the confederal revolution should not be confused with the Kurds themselves, who are only one component of it. Most of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters are Arabs, as are most of the personnel of the Northeastern Autonomous Administration (DAA).
The DAA is under attack from the theocratic faction that for years has imposed a Muslim Brotherhood-led “interim government” along its northwestern border, and over whose militias Turkey has direct control. With the collapse of the Syrian state, the SDF has expanded its presence across large territories in the regions of Tabqa, Raqqa, and Deir el-Zor, but lost the Sheeba and Manbij areas to the militias. In the rest of Syria, Arab and Druze forces from the south, whose political orientation is a mix of opposites, have also taken positions in addition to Tahrir al-Sham.
The SDF do not have sufficient equipment to fend off Turkey for long. This is why they had built deterrence over time through diplomatic agreements, both with Russia, whose interposition forces were present in the western part of the DAA but have since withdrawn, and with the U.S. in the eastern part, who might also withdraw as soon as Trump comes to power. The status quo that enabled the DAA (which since 2019 has been hit constantly by Turkish air strikes) to stand, although precariously, is thus largely a thing of the past. New points of balance and new arrangements appear necessary. Otherwise, the confederal revolution could be crushed by a large-scale Turkish invasion.
The only path for the DAA, which it is pursuing, is that of internal dialogue, starting with the differences among the new political actors. Tahrir al-Sham has imposed its full powers on Damascus, excluding all other forces from the new transitional government, which replicates the composition of the “national salvation government” in Idlib. This is not a good sign, but it also means that it has excluded the members of the interim government, with whom relations deteriorated during the recent offensive. This unilateral approach by HTS is expected to last until March 1, and could also displease the Arab and Druze movements in the south. New Economy Minister Basel Abdul Aziz has announced free-market reforms to ingratiate himself with international actors, but Al Jolani knows that the disposition of most of the Syrian population toward him is mostly fear, not love, and often contempt. An economic deregulation would also be in continuity with the policies that made the deposed regime subject to popular discontent in 2011, and the poorer base of the opposition is unlikely to see it as a positive.
SDF commander Mazlum Abdi and YPJ commander Rojhelat Afrin have announced in recent days that the confederal revolution is ready to negotiate a peaceful settlement with all forces on the ground, including the new government and Turkey. However, the political fragility of the ruling Islamists is precisely what might lead them to crack down on the faction through which the discontent of part of the Syrians would be most likely to be channeled. The Democratic Congress set up by the confederal movement gives a platform to Arab parties, clans and personalities that could formulate alternative proposals for the country in the coming months, something Damascus might not look kindly on.
According to analyst Amberin Zaman, the ruling Ankara establishment could accept to come to an agreement with the SFD, provided that the latter publicly announce that it was ending all relations with the PKK, and that all YPG volunteers from abroad (mostly from Turkey, Iraq, and Iran) leave the country. Turkey would also like more weight to be given to the conservative Syrian Kurdish parties, which today both oppose the socialist component and support the interim government. Although they are not popular either in Rojava or in the rest of Syria, these groups could be used as a pluralistic fig leaf over the destruction of the political experience for which thousands of Kurdish youth have fought and given their lives.
The leading figure in the coalition supporting the interim government on behalf of Turkey, Hadi al-Bahra, has unsurprisingly proposed a very long transition before new elections: a year and a half. That would be enough time to operate a complete crackdown on the confederal movement, producing new waves of refugees and completing the demographic engineering that Turkey-aligned militias have been engaging in since 2018. The path for the survival of the confederal revolution is a narrow one. It is important to understand this fact in order to support the only real revolution that has emerged from the war. Just as there was no alternative to the confederal movement’s choice not to defend the Baathist army that no longer had the support of its own soldiers, there is no alternative now to attempting dialogue with the forces of the Nov. 27 insurgency. It is likely that the Al-Bashiri government will continue to give Turkey a free hand in Rojava, which would allow the government to get rid of the confederal problem without getting its hands dirty. However, the way forward through the contradictions of the current scenario remains political, not military.
Originally published at https://ilmanifesto.it/una-rivoluzione-confederale-da-salvare on 2024-12-12